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COFVRICHT DEPOSm 



A TRUE ACCOUNT OF THE 

BATTLE OF JUTLAND 



BY 
THOMAS G. FROTHINGHAM 

Captain, U. S. R. 



5a> 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 



A TRUE ACCOUNT OF THE 

BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

MAY 31, 1916 



By 

THOMAS G. FROTHINGHAM 

Captain, U. S. R. 



Author of 

A Guide to the Military History of 

The World War 

1914-1918 



CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 
BACON 4- BROWN 

1920 






Ck)PYHiGHT, Bacon ^ Brown 
I921 



FEB 21 1921 

0)CU605861 



PREFACE 

The following is an account of the essential facts 
of the Battle of Jutland, amplified from the review 
in the author's book, A Guide to the Military His- 
tory of The World War, 191^-1918, published this 
year by Little, Brown & Co. This gives a greatly 
needed description of the events of the naval ac- 
tion, with the forces of both sides placed in true 
relation, one to the other. 

No previously published account had contained 
an adequate treatment of the manoeuvres of both 
fleets, as certain important events of the action 
were not understood, and it had been assumed that 
situations existed for which there was no founda- 
tion in fact. All this has resulted in a mass of con- 
fused and erroneous narratives — and the Battle 
of Jutland has become one of the most misunder- 
stood actions in history. 

The British Admiralty has announced that an 
official record of the Battle of Jutland would not 
be given out. Instead of this, the official dis- 
patches covering the action have been issued in the 
form of a Blue-book. The publication of these 
documents does not help to solve many vexed 



vi PREFACE 

questions — and the need is all the more eviden*t 
of a trustworthy account of the action. 

The reader may feel sure that the real course of 
the great naval battle has been traced in the present 
version, and that the facts here given have been 
established beyond dispute. In this way a reliable 
basis has been provided for reading narratives of 
the action, for studying the details of its varying 
fortunes — and for correcting many erroneous im- 
pressions which have been current. 

A portion of the text was published in the Boston 
Evening Transcript of October 9, 1920. Two of 
the charts have been reproduced from A Guide to 
the Military History of The World War, and the 
thanks of the author are given to Messrs. Little, 
Brown & Co. for their courtesy in allowing use of 
the text of the book. 



LIST OF TABLES 

Table I. The British Grand Fleet at the Battle of 

Jutland 6 

Table II. The German High Seas Fleet at the Battle 

of Jutland . . 7 

LIST OF CHARTS 

Chart showing the Battle of Jutland, in relation to 

the surroundings on the North Sea 9 

Chart No. 1. Typical British Chart, of the later 

manoeuvres of the action which are in dispute . 31 

Chart No. 2. The Battle of Jutland . . facing 54 

Chart No. 2 is so placed that it can be opened 
outside the pages for use as the text is being read. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

MAY 31, 1916 

Authorities quoted in the text are indicated as follows: 
Admiral JeUicoe (J), Vice Admiral Beatty (B), Admiral Scheer (S). 

THE Battle of Jutland has been made a matter 
of bitter controversy, and accounts of the ac- 
tion have been so molded to fit partisan theories 
that the actual events have become obscured. Yet 
these events can now be determined through means 
that were never before available in the case of a 
great naval battle. Both commanders have pub- 
lished their detailed accounts, and there is no longer 
any reason for uncertainty as to the essentials of 
the action. Many of the tales from Germany were 
obviously untrue, but Admiral Scheer, the German 
Commander-in-Chief, has given a straightforward 
story of the battle which supplements the version 
of Admiral Jellicoe, the British Commander-in- 
Chief. 

When the wide field of operations is taken into 
account, the two narratives of the rival command- 
ers agree to a surprising extent as to the events of 
the early stages of the action. The engagement 
between the two advanced forces, the advent of 
the German High Seas Fleet, and the running fight 



2 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

to meet the British Grand Fleet, are related in con- 
firmation of Lord Jellicoe's report, and of the ac- 
count in his book. Concerning the events of these 
first phases of the battle the various British narra- 
tives also practically agree. 

Most of the differences and controversies relate 
to the ensuing stages. Concerning these events of 
the latter part of the action Admiral Scheer sup- 
plies much needed data, throwing new light upon 
manoeuvres which had not been understood by the 
British — and no narrative has yet been published 
which covers this ground. 

To understand the battle, it is necessary to 
remember that it had become the custom of the 
British fleet to leave its safeguarded bases in the 
north of the British Isles and make periodical 
sweeps through the North Sea. The Admiralty 
had ordered the Grand Fleet to begin such a sweep 
on May 30.^ At the beginning of his Report of the 
battle Admiral Jellicoe thus describes the situa- 
tion: 

"The Ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of 
the general policy of periodical sweeps through the 
North Sea, had left its base on the previous day in 

^ "In accordance with instructions contained in their Lordship's 
telegram. No. 434, of 30th May, code time 1740, the Grand Fleet 
proceeded to sea on 30th May, 1916." (J) 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 3 

accordance with instructions issued by me. In the 
early afternoon of Wednesday, May 31, the 1st and 
2nd Battle Cruiser Squadrons, the 1st, 2nd, and 
3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, and destroyers from 
the 1st, 9th, and 13th Flotillas, supported by the 
Fifth Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with 
my directions, scouting to the southward of the 
Battle Fleet." (J) 

On May 31 the German High Seas Fleet was also 
on the North Sea. There had been an insistent 
demand from the German people for activity on 
the part of the battle fleet. In response, the new 
Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Scheer, had taken 
his battleships to sea at times. This change of 
tactics was a demonstration deliberately planned 
for effect in Germany, but Admiral Scheer had 
taken great pains to improve the efficiency of his 
command, and on that day he had with him all the 
strength he could muster, even including the avail- 
able predreadnoughts. He was thus prepared to 
fight, if he could manoeuvre to engage the British 
fleet in part or under conditions advantageous for 
the Germans. This sortie of May 31 brought on 
the Battle of Jutland. 

For some time after the action there were tales 
of other objectives, — to cover the escape of raid- 
ers, to get ships out of the Baltic, etc. Even Lord 



4 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

Jellicoe indulged in theories as to the object of the 
German sortie and the movements that led to the 
engagement. This question has been ended by 
Admiral Scheer's account of his definite order of 
May 18, 1916, for a raid on the east coast of Eng- 
land at Sunderland, including the dispositions of 
U-boats. Such a raid "would be certain to call 
out a display of English fighting forces as promised 
by Mr. Balfour." (S) After a delay on account of 
bad weather, this plan was modified in the opera- 
tion of May 31, off the Skagerrak — and it was 
carried out with the hope, frankly expressed by 
the German Admiral, that his enemy "would af- 
ford us an opportunity to engage part or the 
whole of his fleet in battle under conditions favor- 
able to ourselves." (S) This situation tended to 
bring on a naval action, especially as the Admiralty 
telegram gave the intimation that German naval 
forces would be out. 

The opposing fleets in the Battle of Jutland were 
as follows: 

1. An advance British force under Vice Admiral 
Beatty, consisting of six battle cruisers (four Lions 
of 28 knots speed, each carrying eight 13.5-inch 
guns, and two Indefatigables of 25 knots speed, 
each carrying eight 12-inch guns), supported by 
the Fifth Battle Squadron, under Rear Admiral 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 5 

Evan-Thomas (four 25-knot battleships of the 
Queen Elizabeth class, each carrying eight 15-inch 
guns, Barham (F), Valiant, Malaya, Warspite). 

The fleet speed of this advance force was 25 
knots. 

2. The main body of the British Grand Fleet, 
under Admiral Jellicoe, flying his flag in the Iron 
Duke, consisting of a fast wing under Rear Admiral 
Hood (three 26-knot battle cruisers of Invincible 
class, each carrying eight 12-inch guns), a division 
of four armored cruisers under Rear Admiral 
Arbuthnot, and twenty-four dreadnoughts in three 
squadrons commanded by Vice Admirals Burney, 
Jerram, and Sturdee. 

The fleet speed of this main body was 20 knots, 
and its formidable armament will be found in 
Table I. 

3. Twenty-five light cruisers, and seventy-eight 
destroyers, "47 with the Battle Fleet, 31 with 
Battle Cruisers." (J) 

The German strength comprised: 

1. An advance force under Vice Admiral Hipper, 
consisting of five battle cruisers (three Derfflingers 
of 28 knots speed, each carrying eight 12-inch 
guns, and two Moltkes of 27 knots speed, each 
carrying ten 11-inch guns). 

The fleet speed of this advance force was 27 knots. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 



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8 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

2. The main body of the German High Seas 
Fleet, under Admiral Scheer, consisting of sixteen 
dreadnoughts ["Konig Albert absent" (S)] and six 
predreadnought battleships. 

The fleet speed of this main body was 17 knots, 
because the German dreadnoughts had been eked 
out with predreadnought battleships of less speed. 
Its less powerful armament will be found in Table 11. 

3. Eleven light cruisers and about seventy-eight 
destroyers, divided between the advance force and 
the main body. (Admiral Jellicoe gives the Ger- 
mans eighty-eight destroyers, but it is known that 
all were not in action.) 

The above-described make-up of the opposing 
fleets must be kept in mind, when studying the 
course of the action. The day of the battle was 
cloudy, but the sun shone through the clouds most 
of the time. At no time was there anything ap- 
proaching a sea. Visibility was reported as good 
in the first stages of the action, but later in the 
afternoon, there being little wind, mist and smoke 
hung heavy over the surface of the sea. These 
conditions must also be remembered, as the in- 
creasing mist had a great influence on the course 
of the action. 

The following outline will bring the action to 
the stage at which detailed comment should begin. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 



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From ^ Guide to the Military History of The World War, 1914-1918. 

Chart showing the Battle of Jutland, in relation to the surroundings 
on the North Sea. (1) The Battle Field, May 31, 1916. (2) Position 
of British Fleet "at about 2.47 a.m.," (J) June 1, 1916. (This chart 
is diagrammatic only.) 

In the sweep through the North Sea, with the 
main body of the British Grand Fleet some seventy 
miles distant, Vice Admiral Beatty's advance force 
was cruising to southward of Admiral Jellicoe May 
31, 1916, when, at 2.20 p.m., the presence of enemy 
ships was reported by a light cruiser. Admiral 



10 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

Beatty altered course "to the eastward and sub- 
sequently to northeastward, the enemy being 
sighted at 3.31 p.m. Their force consisted of five 
battle cruisers." (B) This was the German ad- 
vance under Vice Admiral Hipper. 

It is stated in Vice Admiral Beatty 's report that 
it was over an hour after the first news of the 
vicinity of enemy ships before he increased speed 
to 25 knots to engage, "at 3.30 p.m." (B) Yet 
Vice Admiral Beatty reports that Rear Admiral 
Evan-Thomas's Fifth Battle Squadron (the four 
Queen Elizabeths) was still 10,000 yards away when 
he made this move to engage the Germans with his 
battle cruisers. Consequently Vice Admiral Beatty 
failed to impose his whole strength upon his en- 
emy's detached force. 

It is hard to explain this situation except by 
believing that Vice Admiral Beatty was confident 
that his six battle cruisers alone would be able to 
cope with the enemy. Allowing his force to re- 
main divided by such an interval was unfortunate, 
and it cannot be said that the best use was made 
of the British advance force in the first stage of the 
engagement. 

At 3.48 "the action commenced at a range of 
18,500 yards, both sides opening fire practically 
simultaneously." (B) The British battle cruisers 



THE BATTLE OF eTUTLAND 11 

fought on a course curving to the southeast, and 
then on a south-southeast course, and the five 
German battle cruisers fought them on a parallel 
course, instead of edging away from the superior 
British force. It is now easy to see that the trend 
of the action was absolutely in the direction of the 
approaching main body of the German High Seas 
Fleet, but this, very naturally, was not apparent 
at the time to Vice Admiral Beatty. 

The first phase of the battle may properly be 
studied as a fight between the British and German 
battle cruisers, in consequence of the before-stated 
gap separating the two parts of Admiral Beatty 's 
command. This interval of 10,000 yards pre- 
vented the Fifth Battle Squadron of Queen Eliza- 
beth dreadnoughts from being a factor at the time. 
Vice Admiral Beatty reports that this squadron 
"opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards," and he 
continues: "The Fifth Battle Squadron was en- 
gaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at 
very long range." Only two of the German ships 
were really under fire from the Fifth Battle Squa- 
dron, and these two battle cruisers were but slightly 
injured in the run to the south. 

In this part of the action came the first of the 
many upsets of prewar calculations. Comparing 
the given strength of the two opposing squadrons 



U THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

in action, it will be seen that the British battle 
cruisers were greatly superior; in fact, the odds 
would have been considered prohibitive before this 
battle. Yet it was the British squadron that suf- 
fered, losing one-third of its ships . "Atabout4.06" 
(J) the Indefatigable was sunk, and "at about 4.26" 
(J) the Queen Mary met the same fate. In each case 
there was a great explosion up through the turrets, 
suggesting that a weak turret construction is really 
a dangerous conductor of fire to the magazine in 
case of a heavy hit, and pointing to the need of 
better separation of the supply of ammunition from 
the magazine. 

At 4.15 there were attacks "simultaneously" (B) 
by British and German destroyers which resulted 
in a lively fight, but no damage to any of the capital 
ships. Yet the possibilities of such torpedo attacks 
were so evident, here and later in the battle, that 
the destroyer at once attained a greater value as 
an auxiliary of the battleship. A British airplane 
had been sent up from a mother ship just before 
the engagement, though Admiral Beatty reports 
that it was forced to fly low on account of the 
clouds, and had a hard task "to identify four 
enemy light cruisers." (B) There was apparently 
no chance of a wide observation that would have 
warned Admiral Beatty of the approaching Ger- 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 13 

man High Seas Fleet. In this short hour were 
concentrated many new problems of naval warfare. 

The advancing German High Seas Fleet was re- 
ported at 4.38 by a light cruiser, the Southampton, 
and sighted at 4.42 by the British battle cruisers. 
A few minutes later Vice Admiral Beatty's ships 
turned right about (180 degrees) in succession. 
The German battle cruisers also turned to a north- 
westerly course. 

One great advantage was gained for the British 
in this manoeuvre. By the turn in succession the 
four Queen Elizabeth battleships, the Fifth Battle 
Squadron, were brought into position to fight a 
rearguard action against the greatly strengthened 
force of the enemy. The leading German battle- 
ships, which were of the Konig class, fell into line, 
closely following Admiral Hipper's battle cruisers, 
and the battle was continued at 14,000 yards on a 
northwest course. 

In the meantime, from the north, the British 
Grand Fleet had been closing at utmost fleet speed 
on south and southeast by south courses, disposed 
in six divisions, numbered from port to starboard, 
on parallel courses as shown in Table I. Admiral 
Jellicoe had received no certain information from 
Vice Admiral Beatty as to the positions of the en- 
gaged ships, and he had been proceeding in the 



14 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

general direction of the running fight, instead of 
having in mind any definite point for joining forces 
with Vice Admiral Beatty. It must also be real- 
ized that conditions of increasing mist and inter- 
mittent fog, which rendered observation very un- 
certain, had become prevalent. 



It is from this stage of the action that the tactics 
of the battle have become involved in controversy 

— and a new account of the ensuing events of the 
battle is greatly needed. 

In the first place, it should be stated that a broad 
tactical situation existed that was almost beyond 
the hopes of the British. This was irrespective of 
any moves of the British Commander-in-Chief, or 
of the Commander of the British advance force. 
By its own act the weaker German fleet was out in 
the North Sea, committed to an enterprise which 
had taken it away from its bases. Not only that 

— but, by bringing out the squadron of predread- 
noughts. Admiral Scheer's fleet speed was reduced 
to 17 knots. Casting aside all details of tactics, 
this constituted the established condition that the 
weaker fleet of inferior speed had offered the op- 
portunity to the British fleet — and evasion by 
flight alone was impossible. Looked at in this 
light, it was a better chance than could ever have 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 15 

been expected. Yet a combination of circum- 
stances, including weather conditions, tactics, and 
methods, prevented a decision, where such a result 
seemed to be insured. 

This is the underlying tragedy of Jutland — and 
this is why all the accounts have to deal with ex- 
planations and justifications. 

One very unfavorable situation was being de- 
veloped at this stage, at the time when the British 
advance force was seeking a junction with the 
Grand Fleet. As has been said. Lord Jellicoe was 
not receiving information that would enable him 
to join forces effectively with Vice Admiral Beatty. 
The original disposition of the British naval 
strength, with the advance force flung ahead of 
the Grand Fleet, was sound, if there were tactical 
coordination between the separated parts. It is 
impossible to say that this existed, and the im- 
perfect information given by Vice Admiral Beatty 
to the Commander-in-Chief is a notable feature of 
the battle. 

With all due allowance for interference and dam- 
age to the wireless, especially on the Lion, it is 
hard to see why Lord Jellicoe should have been so 
badly informed as to the positions of the ships 
engaged, and why definite information should have 
been so long delayed. In this important phase of 



16 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

the tactics of the battle we are forced to the con- 
clusion that all means had not been taken to insure 
the coordination of the British advance force and 
the Grand Fleet through linking up ships and other 
methods. 

This disposition of the British forces had often 
been used, and the logical aim of the sweep of the 
North Sea was to find and engage the enemy. Yet, 
when the enemy actually was found, it became 
evident that methods had not been developed for 
using the whole British force as parts of one great 
manoeuvre. With the uncertain information that 
Admiral Jellicoe possessed as to what was going 
on, any such joint manoeuvre could only have 
taken place through a miracle of luck. As a matter 
of fact, there was an error of twelve miles to the 
eastward in location. 



After the turn to the north, in the running fight 
in pursuit of Vice Admiral Beatty's force, the Ger- 
man fleet was approaching the British Grand Fleet, 
which drew near in the increasing mist. To under- 
stand the course of the action at this critical stage, 
the reader should realize that the Germans pos- 
sessed a fleet manoeuvre which had been carefully 
rehearsed for such a contingency, in sudden con- 
tact with a superior enemy force. This was a 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 17 

simultaneous "swing-around" (S) of all the ships 
of the fleet, to turn the line and bring it into an 
opposite course. Admiral Scheer emphasizes the 
pains that had been taken to develop the ability 
to carry out this manoeuvre, which had before been 
considered impracticable for a fleet in action. "At 
our peace manoeuvres great importance was always 
attached to their being carried out on a curved line 
and every means employed to ensure the working 
of the signals." (S) He is certainly justified in 
adding the statement that "the trouble spent was 
now well repaid," as the German Admiral was by 
this means enabled to carry out an unexpected and 
very effective manoeuvre on two occasions when 
his fleet would have been in cramped positions 
without this recourse. Admiral Scheer was also 
able to use this identical manoeuvre in an attack. 

The British did not have any idea that the Ger- 
man Command would be able to carry out this 
change of direction of the German line. Conse- 
quently, in the smoke and mist, these thrice-exe- 
cuted movements were not suspected by the Brit- 
ish. With such an important part of the German 
tactics unnoticed, and not taken into account in 
relation to the British movements, the reasons are 
evident that make necessary a new story of these 
phases of the action. 



18 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

At this stage of the running fight, the British 
battle cruisers, on a northwesterly course, had 
drawn ahead. The four Queen Elizabeth battle- 
ships of Evan-Thomas's Fifth Battle Squadron 
were following them and "thereby played the 
part of cover for the badly damaged cruisers." (S) 
The fight had "developed into a stern chase," (S) 
with Hipper's battle cruisers engaging the British 
battle cruisers, and the German Main Fleet press- 
ing on in chase of the Fifth Battle Squadron. 
The German fleet was disposed in this order: 
Squadron III, Squadron I, Squadron II, (pre- 
dreadnoughts) } 

Squadrons III and I had opened fire at 4.45, but 
although they showed "speed much in excess of 
that for which they were designed," (J) the Ger- 
man battleships were gradually falling behind the 
fast British ships. Admiral Beatty's cruisers had 
drawn clear and shortly after 5.00 were free from 
the fire of Hipper's battle cruisers. His increase 
to full speed enabled Vice Admiral Beatty to draw 
ahead. He again opened up a gap between his 
battle cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, tak- 
ing a course that curved to the north and north- 
east, in search of Admiral Jellicoe's battle fleet, 
which was hastening to his assistance. 

1 See Table H. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 19 

The ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron were also 
drawing away from the German battleships and 
were soon only under fire from the German battle 
cruisers and the leading division of Squadron HI. 
As the British battleships continued to distance 
their pursuers, and the fire even of this leading 
German division grew ineffective, Admiral Scheer 
at 5.20 signaled to Vice Admiral Hipper "to give 
chase." Hipper had already been outdistanced 
by the British battle cruisers. He was "forced, in 
order not to lose touch, to follow on the inner 
circle and adopt the enemy's course." (S) As 
Beatty swung by the north to a northeasterly di- 
rection, Hipper conformed to his course. At this 
stage the weather grew hazy. The wind changed 
from northwest to southwest, and smoke hung 
over the water. 

The German advance was soon in a position 
where it could not engage to any advantage in the 
mist "with the sun so low on the horizon." (S) 
Hipper was also in danger from torpedo attacks, 
and at 5.40 the German Vice Admiral was com- 
pelled to turn his battle cruisers to starboard, "and 
finally bring the unit round to S. W." (S), to close 
up with the German battleships. This manoeuvre 
was observed in the mist by the British, but not 
until some time after it was being carried out, as 



20 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

Lord Jellicoe placed it "between 6 and 6.16." (J) 
At the same time the leading German battle-ships 
had also begun to veer around to starboard, to 
conform with the course of the British advance, 
which was swinging from northeast to an easterly 
direction. Observing this. Admiral Scheer states 
that at 5.45 the order "Leaders in Front" was 
signaled, "and the speed temporarily reduced to 
fifteen knots to make it possible for the divisions 
ahead, which had pushed on at high pressure, to 
get into position again." (S) By this means, and 
through the early closing up of Hipper's battle 
cruisers, as described. Admiral Scheer's whole com- 
mand was more in hand than had been believed. 
The intervals were closed and the German fleet in 
better readiness for its rehearsed manoeuvre, to 
change direction of the line. These alterations of 
speed and direction also probably increased the 
difficulties of the British in locating the German 
fleet at this time, of which Lord Jellicoe writes in 
describing this stage of the action. 

Still thinking that the German fleet would be 
encountered more to the eastward. Lord Jellicoe 
had altered the course of the Grand Fleet to south 
and then to southeast. (6.02 and 6.08.) The Lion 
had been sighted, and at 6.06 had signaled that 
"the enemy's battle cruisers bore southeast." (J) 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 21 

At 6.14 the Lion signaled, "Have sighted the en- 
emy's battle fleet bearing south-southwest." (J) 
Lord Jellicoe writes: "This report gave me the 
first information on which I could take effective 
action for deployment." At 6.16 Lord Jellicoe made 
signal to the Grand Fleet to form line of battle on 
the port wing column on a course southeast by east. 

In the meantime the light German forces had 
become involved in a fight between the lines and 
were withdrawing under cover of smoke screens 
and torpedo attacks. The cruiser Wiesbaden was 
reported disabled at 6.02, and Scheer turned his 
fleet two points to port "to render assistance to 
the Wiesbaden'' (S) — a strange reason for such 
a move at such a time! This brought on what 
Admiral Scheer called "heavy fighting round the 
damaged Wiesbaden'' from 6.20. Yet this eccen- 
tric thrust of the German fleet actually resulted in 
heavy damage to the British. 

At this time the Grand Fleet was deploying as 
described, but not yet seriously engaged. Lord 
Jellicoe reports the Marlborough as opening fire at 
6.17, the Iron Duke firing a few salvos at 6.20. 
But Vice Admiral Beatty's four remaining battle 
cruisers were in closer action, as Beatty was cross- 
ing the German van on a course turning from east 
to southeast. The speed of the deploying Grand 



22 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

Fleet had been reduced to 14 knots to allow 
Beatty's cruisers to pass ahead, "as there was 
danger of the fire of the Battle Fleet being blank- 
eted by them." (J) The Fifth Battle Squadron 
had been left behind Beatty's battle cruisers by a 
long interval, and was making a turn to port (at 
6.19) to form astern of the Grand Fleet. 

Rear Admiral Hood's Third Squadron of three 
battle cruisers which had been ordered to reinforce 
Beatty's advance, was far ahead of the Grand 
Fleet, and had overrun to the southeast in the 
error as to location. On realizing this mistake, 
Hood had turned back in the direction of the 
British advance. Hood's squadron was signaled 
by Vice Admiral Beatty *'to form single line ahead 
and take station" (J) ahead of Admiral Beatty's 
four remaining battle cruisers, which were turned 
to a southeast and southerly course across the 
van of the German fleet. In obedience to this 
signal, Rear Admiral Hood turned to take station 
ahead (6.21), closing to a range of 8,000 yards 
(6.25). "At about 6.34" (J) his flagship, the In- 
vincible, was sunk by gunfire. 

Almost at the same time three of Rear Admiral 
Arbuthnot's armored cruisers, Black Prince, War- 
rior, and Defence, "not aware of the approach of 
the enemy's heavy ships," (J) were put out of 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 23 

action. {Defence was sunk; Warrior sank while 
attempt was being made to tow her home; Black 
Prince was sunk later.) In the turn of the Fifth 
Battle Squadron to take position astern of the 
Grand Fleet the Warsjrite had jammed her helm 
and was out of control for a while. She was a 
good deal damaged by gunfire, but was extricated 
from her predicament and taken back to the Brit- 
ish base. 

By this time the German Commander-in-Chief 
had received information from his torpedo flotillas 
of the presence of '*more than twenty enemy battle- 
ships following a southerly course." (S) His van 
was under heavy fire. "Following the movements 
of the enemy they had made a bend which hindered 
free action" (S) of his torpedo flotilla, and his 
cruisers were also cramped between the fire of both 
lines. In this awkward situation Admiral Scheer 
resolved to make use of his prepared manoeuvre, 
to change the direction of his line. Accordingly 
at 6.35 "the swing-around was carried out in excel- 
lent style," (S) the ships turning simultaneously 
to starboard, putting the whole German fleet on 
a westerly course. 

This manoeuvre was covered by the use of dense 
smoke screens, and the pressure on the German 
fleet was relieved at once. Admiral Scheer states 



M THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

that "the enemy did not follow our veer around," 
and he strongly insists that the British should 
have held firmly to his line by executing a similar 
manoeuvre. But he really gives the true state of 
the case when he writes: "It may be that the 
leader did not grasp the situation." In fact none 
of the British commanders realized what had taken 
place under cover of that smoke screen. 

After the sinking of the Invincible, although Vice 
Admiral Beatty was reported as turning to star- 
board, there was no further aggressive action on 
his part — and, in the next fifteen minutes (6.50), 
he signaled the two remaining battle cruisers of 
the Third Squadron to take station astern of the 
last ship of his line, the New Zealand. 

At the same time (6.50) the Grand Fleet, which 
had completed deployment at 6.38, altered course 
to south by divisions to close. 

These movements of the British forces naturally 
did not succeed in bringing any pressure upon 
the Germans, as Admiral Scheer's whole fleet was 
then safely on a westerly course, as a result of the 
simultaneous swing-around of his line — and the 
German fleet was concealed by dense smoke 
screens, which left the British in ignorance of 
Scheer's manoeuvre. Encouraged by this success- 
ful result of his move, and finding his ships all able 



THE BATTLE OF eTUTLAND 25 

to keep their places in the line, "fully prepared to 
fight," (S) the German Admiral decided upon an 
unexpected course of action. His change of tactics 
was so remarkable that his reasons should be quo- 
ted at length : 

"It was still too early for a nocturnal move. If 
the enemy followed us, our action in retaining the 
direction taken after turning the line would par- 
take of the nature of a retreat, and in the event 
of any damage to our ships in the rear the Fleet 
would be compelled to sacrifice them or else to 
decide on a line of action enforced by enemy pres- 
sure, and not adopted voluntarily, and would 
therefore be detrimental to us from the very outset. 
Still less was it feasible to strive at detaching one- 
self from the enemy, leaving him to decide when 
he could elect to meet us the next morning. There 
was but one way of averting this — to force the 
enemy into a second battle by another determined 
advance, and forcibly compel his torpedo boats to 
attack. The success of the turning of the line 
while fighting encouraged me to make the attempt, 
and decided me to make still further use of the 
facility of movement. The manoeuvre would be 
bound to surprise the enemy, to upset his plans 
for the rest of the day, and if the blow fell heavily 
it would facilitate the breaking loose at night." (S) 



26 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

To carry out these ideas Admiral Scheer at 6.55 
executed a second swing-around of his whole fleet 
turning ships-right-about to starboard as before. 
This put the German fleet again on an easterly 
course and launched its van in an attack against 
the deployed British line, "to deal a blow at the 
centre of the enemy's line." (S) Ahead of the 
fleet there was sent forward a determined attack 
by the German torpedo flotillas, all of which "had 
orders to attack." (S) In the words of Admiral 
Scheer, "This led to the intended result, a full 
resumption of the firing at the van." 

The practical effect in action, so far as the Ger- 
man Battle Fleet was concerned, was to subject 
the van of the German fleet to heavy damage, 
without doing any compensating harm to the Brit- 
ish ships. Admiral Scheer admits this damage to 
the German fleet, especially the battle cruisers, 
and it is established that the German fleet did not 
score upon the Grand Fleet. On the other hand, 
the accompanying sudden torpedo attacks, emerg- 
ing from the smoke directed against the British 
battleships, did actually accomplish the result of 
making the Grand Fleet turn away and open the 
range. Admiral Scheer claims that putting the 
van of his fleet again into action "diverted the 
enemy fire and rendered it possible for the torpedo- 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 27 

boat flotillas to take so effective a share in the pro- 
ceedings," (S) but of course it is a question whether 
the same result might not have been obtained by 
the use of the torpedo flotillas alone. 

In any case, it must be acknowledged that Ad- 
miral Scheer's extraordinary manoeuvres had ac- 
complished a surprise effect upon his enemy as, 
besides forcing the Grand Fleet to turn away, the 
moral effect of this torpedo attack had a great 
influence upon the British conduct of the rest of 
the action. It is also evident that the British had 
not comprehended the tactics of the Germans. 

One phase of the situation at this time has not 
been understood — but should be strongly empha- 
sized. The fact is that the German Admiral, by 
his own act, had again placed his fleet in the same 
position from which he had once withdrawn — and 
this second creation of the same situation (6.55) 
was after the Grand Fleet had deployed and was in 
line of battle. Consequently, in view of the way 
the battle was really fought, many of the long argu- 
ments as to the so-called crucial situation at the 
time of the British deployment are wasted words. 
Now that it is known that Admiral Scheer came 
back again to attack the fully deployed British 
fleet, the much-discussed method of deployment 
can no longer be considered all-important. Even 



28 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

if the deployment had not come to the Germans, 
the Germans had gone to the deployment — and 
the same situation existed. In their ignorance of 
the German Admiral's smoke-screened manoeuvres, 
both sides of the heated British controversy have 
missed the essential fact of this unusual duplication 
of a battle situation, which actually occurred at 
Jutland. 

This lack of understanding of Scheer's turn and 
return is plainly shown by Admiral Jellicoe, who 
writes, concerning the situation after 7.00: "Our 
alteration of course to the south had, meanwhile, 
brought the enemy's line into view once more." 
The British Command did not realize that his 
enemy had actually voluntarily come back into 
the former position, and this was the real reason 
the German ships had reappeared. 

At 7.05 the whole British battle line had been 
turned together three more points to starboard. 
But at 7.10 the sudden attack of the German 
torpedo flotillas was sighted, and shortly after- 
wards the British fleet was turned away to port 
two points, and then two points more, to avoid 
the run of the torpedoes. Admiral Jellicoe states 
that this move enabled his battleships to avoid 
many torpedoes, and that the range was opened by 
about 1,750 yards. The German Admiral claims 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 29 

that "the action of the torpedo-boat flotillas had 
achieved its purpose." (S) 

After accomplishing this result of making his 
enemy turn away, Admiral Scheer at 7.17 for a 
third time successfully executed the same manoeu- 
vre of ships-right-about (in this third turn Scheer 's 
flagship, Friedrich der Grosse, was cramped and 
made the turn to port), and again his fleet was on 
a westerly course screened by dense smoke. This 
swing-around again had the same effect of freeing 
the German fleet from the gunflre of the British 
fleet. The British Command again did not grasp 
the full import of the German move. He writes 
of the difficulty of observation in the mist and 
smoke. Some of his subordinates reported that 
the Germans had turned away at this time, but 
none realized that a ships-right-about had been 
carried out. It was not until 7.41 that the British 
battle fleet was altered by divisions three points 
to starboard to close. 

Shortly after (at 7.47), Vice Admiral Beatty 
made signal to Lord Jellicoe: *' Urgent. Submit 
that the van of battleships follow the cruisers. We 
can then cut off the whole of the enemy's battle 
fleet." Much has been made of this signal by 
ill-advised critics. In fact it will be self-evident 
that, at the time Beatty's signal was sent, the Ger- 



30 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

man fleet was not in the assumed position, but had 
long before been extricated from its dangerous con- 
tact by the third "swing-around" (S) at 7.17, and 
the Germans ships were again safely proceeding on 
their altered course. 

It is a strange comment on the battle to realize 
that the thrice executed German manoeuvre of 
ships-right-about was not observed by anyone on 
the British fleet. None of the British maps or 
charts of the action shows any sign of these move- 
ments. Chart No. 1 is a typical British diagram 
of this stage of the action. It will be noted that 
the times (6.15 to 7.41) in the indications of the 
course of the German fleet include the times of 
all three turns of ships-right-about. (6.35, 6.55, 
7.17.) Yet there is no trace of these German 
manoeuvres on the plan. Chart No. 2 shows the 
contrast between the supposed movements of 
the Germans and their actual manoeuvres in 
the battle. 

One reason for the failure of the British to under- 
stand these manoeuvres of Admiral Scheer was the 
fixed conviction of the British that such a simul- 
taneous turn of all the ships of a fleet was imprac- 
ticable in action — consequently they did not 
expect it to be used by their enemies. This doc- 
trine has been stated by Lord Jellicoe in explaining 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 



31 



Course ofthegerman 
High Seas Fleet 




IZpOOyards 




7.59 



CHART NO. 1 

Typical British Chart, of the later manceuvres of the action which 
are in dispute. 

It will be noted that, in the time covered, between 6.15 and 7.41, the 
course of the German Fleet gives no indication of the thrice executed 
change of direction of the German line by ships-right-about. All of these 
were carried out within this period (6.35, 6.55, 7.17). 

Lord Jellicoe's own maps show this lack of knowledge of the German 
manoeuvres of ships-right-about, as they do not indicate these important 
moves of the Germans. In his report Admiral Jellicoe spoke of the "turn- 
away under cover of torpedo-boat destroyer attacks" (J) as "difficult to 
counter" (J) — but he did not understand the real reason that made the 
difficulty. 



32 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

his own movements in the battle. "The objection 
to altering by turning all the ships together was 
the inevitable confusion that would have ensued 
as the result of such a manoeuvre carried out with 
a very large fleet under action conditions in misty 
weather." This positive statement was made by 
the British Commander-in-Chief in perfect uncon- 
sciousness that his antagonist had in fact success- 
fully carried out such a turn three times under the 
identical conditions described! 

After the turn to a westerly course, the German 
fleet was brought around to a southwesterly, south- 
erly, and finally to a southeasterly course "to meet 
the enemy's encircling movements and keep open 
a way for our return." (S) From this time Ad- 
miral Scheer's fleet was not in great danger, nor 
even seriously engaged. As the twilight advanced 
the German Command could prepare for the night. 
He found all his battleships in condition to do 16 
knots "the speed requisite for night work, and 
thus keep their places in the line. " (S) Vice Ad- 
miral Hipper' s flagship the Liitzow had been so 
badly damaged that he had changed his flag to 
the Moltke (7.00). ^ At 7.30 the Liitzow could do 15 
knots, and her condition grew worse steadily, but 

^ It was nearly two hours before Vice Admiral Hipper could get 
on board the Moltke. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 33 

she was the only ship that could not be relied upon 
to maintain fleet speed. 

Consequently Admiral Scheer was not hard 
pressed at this stage, but only intermittently en- 
gaged. The order of the German fleet, after the 
last turn to westerly, had been Squadron II, Squad- 
ron I, Squadron III. Squadron II (the slower pre- 
dreadnoughts) fell out to starboard, and was passed 
by Squadrons I and III, giving support to Hipper's 
battle cruisers, which were engaged at 8.20. The 
Germans were all the time making use of smoke for 
concealment, in addition to the mist and the in- 
creasing darkness. 

As a result of these tactics, the British Admiral 
was always groping for his enemy in mist and 
smoke, with only occasional glimpses of the Ger- 
man ships. Although he had not understood the 
German manoeuvre, Lord Jellicoe had become con- 
vinced that the Germans had turned away, and at 
7.59 he had altered course by divisions to west to 
close his enemy. It was again natural that he did 
not gain much actual contact. Lord Jellicoe writes 
of the fighting, already mentioned, at 8.20, in 
which the battle cruisers of both sides and the 
German predreadnoughts were engaged, and ex- 
plains the puzzling conditions of the action at this 
stage. "At 8.30 p.m. the light was failing and the 



34 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

fleet was turned by divisions to a southwest course, 
thus reforming single hne again." (J) All this 
time his elusive enemy was screening his move- 
ments by the use of smoke, and the German ships 
would only occasionally be visible in the smoke 
and mist. 

As the darkness came on, it is evident that these 
tactics on the part of the Germans, with increasing 
threats of torpedo attacks, became more and more 
baffling to the British Command, and then came 
the crucial decision which ended the battle. Ad- 
miral Jellicoe reports: 

*'At 9 P.M. the enemy was entirely out of sight, 
and the threat of torpedoboat-destroyer attacks 
during the rapidly approaching darkness made it 
necessary for me to dispose of the fleet for the 
night, with a view to its safety from such attacks, 
while providing for a renewal of action at daylight. 
I accordingly manoeuvred to remain between the 
enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a posi- 
tion in which they would afford protection to the 
fleet from destroyer attack and at the same time 
be favorably situated for attacking the enemy's 
heavy ships." 

Concerning this stage of the action Admiral 
Jellicoe in his report quotes Vice Admiral Beatty 
as follows: "In view of the gathering darkness 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 35 

and the fact that our strategical position was such 
as to make it appear certain that we should locate 
the enemy at daylight under most favorable cir- 
cumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper 
to close the enemy battle-fleet during the dark 
hours." 

Here the British Admiral and his subordinate 
were in accord, but of course the responsibility 
for the movements of the British fleet rested with 
Admiral Jellicoe, as Commander-in-Chief. By his 
order the British fleet steamed through the dark 
hours on southerly courses "some eighty-five 
miles" (J) from the battlefield. Although the 
British fleet was thus placed in the general direc- 
tion of Heligoland, this meant that Admiral Jellicoe 
relinquished contact, in a military sense, with the 
German fleet. At the time it was undoubtedly 
Lord Jellicoe's intention to renew the action the 
next day, but it must be clearly understood that this 
was to be in every way a new naval battle — not a 
battle continued by keeping in touch with his en- 
emy and reexerting his force on the following day. 

Admiral Jellicoe himself is explicit upon this 
point, and states that "at 9 p.m." he ordered his 
fleet "to alter course by divisions to south, inform- 
ing the Flag officers of the Battle Cruiser Fleet, 
the cruiser and light cruiser squadrons, and the 



S6 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

officers commanding destroyer flotillas, of my 
movements in order that they should conform." (J) 
Nothing could be more definitely established than 
the fact that this broke off the action of fleets in 
every real sense of the word. The British light 
craft were to conform to the movements of the 
Battle Fleet, and there was no hint of maintaining 
a screen or contact that would develop the posi- 
tion of the enemy fleet. 

This situation should be kept clearly in mind. 
There were many encounters throughout the night 
between British and German war-craft of various 
types, but these fought on their own initiative, and 
there was no concerted touch maintained with the 
German fleet — nothing that could be called a 
part of a battle of fleets. The Germans simply 
ploughed their way home through the stragglers 
left in the wake of the British fleet, and Lord Jelli- 
coe frankly states that he was out of touch with 
his cruisers and destroyers. Consequently Lord 
Jellicoe's decision, and move to the south, ended 
the Battle of Jutland. 

This should be recognized as the final decision 
of the battle, and the British Commander-in-Chief 
makes it plain that he so considered it, as he states 
the situation at the time and the reasons which 
influenced him. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 37 

At 9 o'clock the German fleet was to the west- 
ward. The British fleet was between it and all its 
bases. The British fleet was superior in speed, 
and had such an overwhelming superiority in ships 
and guns that it could afford to discard its dam- 
aged ships without impairing this superiority. The 
British Admiral had light cruisers and destroyers, 
to throw out a screen and to maintain touch with 
the German fleet. There was a proportion of 
damaged ships in the German fleet; and this, with 
its original inferior fleet speed, would have made 
it a hard task for the German fleet to ease around 
the British fleet and reach the German bases. 
These conditions were in favor of keeping in touch 
with the German fleet. 

On the other hand, for Admiral Jellicoe to have 
kept his fleet in touch with the German fleet 
through the dark hours, even by the most efficient 
use of his screen of destroyers and cruisers, would 
have meant taking the risk of a night action, 
which would have involved his capital ships, as 
Admiral Scheer intended to fight his way through 
that night. Above all things there was the omi- 
nous threat of torpedo attacks in the night, with 
possibilities of disaster to the Battle Fleet upon 
which depended the established British control of 
the seas. 



38 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

Lord Jellicoe's arguments show that he followed 
a line of conduct well considered in advance/ and 
he writes with a sincere conviction that his act in 
breaking off the battle was justified by the results. 
In explaining the many advantages possessed by 
the weaker German fleet Admiral Jellicoe also re- 
veals disappointing conditions in backwardness of 
methods on the part of the British Navy. There 
was not alone the lack of modern methods in range- 
finding and director fire-control, but also in torpedo 
attack and defense, and in preparation for action 
"under night conditions." (J) ^ It is something of 
a shock to read that the stronger British fleet went 
into the Jutland battle with a handicap in these 
essentials that became a factor to prevent a de- 
cisive action.3 Lord Jellicoe makes a very strong 

^Lord Jellicoe had sent to the Admiralty a formal dispatch 
(October 30, 1914) stating his conviction that the Germans would 
"rely to a great extent on submarines, mines and torpedoes," (J) 
and defining his own "tactical methods in relation to these forms 
of attack." (J) On November 7, 1914, the Admiralty approved 
the "views stated therein." Lord Jellicoe in his book cites this 
Admiralty approval of 1914 as applying to the Battle of Jutland. 

2 "The German organization at night is very good. Their 
system of recognition signals is excellent. Ours are practically 
nil. Their searchlights are superior to ours, and they use them 
with great effect. Finally, their method of firing at night gives 
excellent results. I am reluctantly of the opinion that under 
night conditions we have a good deal to learn from them." (J) 

3 "The British Fleet was not properly equipped for fighting an 
action at night. The German fleet was. Consequently to fight 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 39 

plea for his contention that, under the existing 
conditions of smoke, mist and darkness, with the 
German fleet skilfully taking advantage of these 
conditions, and with the handicaps of the Grand 
Fleet in construction, equipment, and methods to 
contend with these tactics and conditions, there 
was no opportunity to force a decision without 
prohibitive risks of losing the existing supremacy 
of the British Navy on the seas.^ 

Accordingly, at 9 o'clock Admiral Jellicoe dis- 
posed the British battleships for the night in col- 
umns of divisions abeam one mile apart, to insure 
the columns not losing sight of one another through 
the dark hours. The destroyer flotillas were di- 
rected to take station five miles astern. In this 
order the British fleet steamed through the night 
at seventeen knots "some 85 miles" (J) on a 
southerly course. The only British ship that is 
mentioned as having been given another mission 
was the small minelayer Ahdiel which was sent 
to strew mines in an area off the Vyl Lightship 
"over which it was expected the High Seas Fleet 
would pass if the ships attempted to regain their 

them at night would only have been to court disaster. Lord Jelli- 
coe's business was to preserve the Grand Fleet, the main defense 
of the Empire as well as of the Allied cause, not to risk its existence." 
Sir Percy Scott, Fifty Years in the Royal Navy. 

1 See^ Guide to the Military History of The World War, pp. 320-22. 



40 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

ports during the night via the Horn Reef." (J) 
No other craft was assigned to observe or harass 
the German fleet. The Sixth Division of the 
Grand Fleet had fallen behind, as the Marlborough, 
which had been damaged by a torpedo, could not 
maintain fleet speed. (This ship had to be sent 
back after 2 a.m., and Sir Cecil Burney transferred 
his flag to the Revenge.) The British light craft 
also became widely scattered in the dark hours. 

Within a few minutes of the time of Lord Jel- 
licoe's signal for the move to the south. Ad- 
miral Scheer gave his order for the night (9.06), 
"course S. S. E. KE. speed 16 knots." (S) The 
German Admiral fully expected to be attacked by 
the British fleet and to meet strong opposition, but 
he decided that the German "main fleet in close 
formation was to make for Horn Reef by the 
shortest route." (S) The fleet was disposed in the 
same order, Squadrons I, III, II, with the battle 
cruisers covering the rear — "out of consideration 
for their damaged condition." (S) The German 
Admiral placed these weaker ships in the rear, as 
he thought his van would encounter resistance and 
might be heavily engaged in the expected night 
action. His torpedo flotillas were disposed "in 
an E. N. E. to S. S. W. direction, which was where 
the enemy Main Fleet could be expected." (S) 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 41 

Thus disposed the German Battle Fleet moved 
through the dark hours, on a straight course for 
Horn Reef, without meeting the expected attacks, 
which the strong Squadron I in the van was pre- 
pared to ward off. There really was no chance of 
engaging the British battleships, as the Grand 
Fleet had moved to the south before the German 
fleet crossed Lord Jellicoe's course. The Nassau 
got out of station, when she struck a stray British 
destroyer in the darkness, and made for a morning 
rendezvous. The rest of the dreadnoughts of the 
High Seas Fleet met no delay nor mishap through 
the dark hours. Of the predreadnoughts, the battle- 
ship Pommern was sunk by a mine or torpedo, with 
loss of all hands. 

Many of the destroyers had fired all their tor- 
pedoes, and these craft were used for emergencies. 
They were very necessary, as the disabled cruisers 
Rostock and Elhing were abandoned and blown 
up, and these destroyers did good service in taking 
off the crews. They also rescued the crew of the 
disabled Liltzow, which was towed through the 
darkness until she was so down by the head that 
her screws spun in the air. She was abandoned 
and destroyed by a torpedo at 1.45 a.m. Admiral 
Scheer cites the fact that these events could hap- 
pen, without disturbance by the enemy, as "prov- 



42 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

ing that the English Naval forces made no attempt 
to occupy the waters between the scene of battle 
and Horn Reef." (S) 

As a matter of fact this did not need any proof, 
because the British fleet held steadily on its south- 
erly course, without regard to the direction taken 
by the Germans. In the wake of the Grand Fleet 
were left scattered cruisers and destroyers — and 
there were many clashes between these and the 
Germans, but all were isolated fights and adven- 
tures of lame ducks. Some of these encounters 
were reported to Lord Jellicoe and there was much 
shooting, with explosions and fire lighting up the 
darkness. 

Admiral Scheer thought that all this must have 
indicated his position, and, even after not en- 
countering the expected night attacks, the Ger- 
man Admiral expected the British to renew the 
battle promptly at dawn. But in consequence of 
the British Admiral's dispositions for the night, it 
is evident that the position of the German fleet 
was not developed, as Admiral Jellicoe himself says, 
until "the information obtained from our wireless 
directional stations during the early morning." (J) 

As dawn was breaking, "at about 2.47 a.m." (J) 
June 1, Admiral Jellicoe altered course of his fleet 
to the north to retrace his path of the night before. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 43 

His Sixth Division of battleships had dropped 
astern, out of sight. His cruisers and destroyers 
were badly scattered, and the British Admiral 
abandoned his intention of seeking a new battle on 
the first of June. 

The straggling of portions of his fleet during 
the move through the darkness is explained by 
Lord Jellicoe, and this caused him to delay his 
search for the German fleet until he could pick 
up the missing craft. His return to find these 
was the reason for retracing the course of the night 
manoeuvre. The following is quoted from Lord 
Jellicoe's book: "The difficulty experienced in col- 
lecting the fleet (particularly the destroyers), due 
to the above causes, rendered it undesirable for 
the Battle Fleet to close the Horn Reef at daylight, 
as had been my intention when deciding to steer 
to the southward during the night. It was obvi- 
ously necessary to concentrate the Battle Fleet 
and the destroyers before renewing action. By 
the time this concentration was effected it had 
become apparent that the High Seas Fleet, steer- 
ing for the Horn Reef, had passed behind the 
shelter of the German mine fields in the early 
morning on their way to their ports." 

Admiral Scheer's fleet had arrived off Horn Reef 
at 3 A.M., where he waited for the disabled Littzow. 



44 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

At 3.30 he learned that she had been abandoned. 
Up to that time the German Admiral had ex- 
pected a new battle of fleets, but he soon divined 
that he was to be free from pressure on the part 
of his enemy. This was confirmed when Admiral 
Scheer learned through a German aircraft scout of 
the straggling of Lord Jellicoe's ships. (L 11 was 
the airship reported by the British "shortly after 
3.30.") Admiral Scheer's comment is: "It is ob- 
vious that this scattering of the forces — which 
can only be explained by the fact that after the 
day-battle Admiral Jellicoe had lost the general 
command — induced the Admiral to avoid a fresh 
battle." Both commanders are consequently on 
record in agreement as to the reason for no new 
battle of fleets. 

The Germans were thus enabled to proceed to 
their bases undisturbed. Admiral Scheer's ac- 
count of the return of the German fleet to its home 
ports, and of the condition of his ships, is convinc- 
ing — and there is no longer any question as to 
the German losses. On the way home the Ostfries- 
land struck a mine, but was not seriously injured, 
making port without difficulty. Outside of the 
destruction of the Lutzow, the German battle 
cruiser squadron was badly battered. The Seyd- 
litz had great difficulty in making her berth, and 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 45 

the Derfflinger was also seriously damaged. To 
sum up the damage done to the battle cruisers of 
both fleets makes a sorry showing for this type of 
warship, which had so great a vogue before The 
World War. 

9 

Admiral Scheer states that, with the exception 
of his two battle cruisers, the German fleet was 
repaired and ready to go to sea again by the middle 
of August, and the Bay em (the first German war- 
ship to mount 38 c.m.-guns) had been added to 
the fleet. He also gives an account of another 
sortie (August 18 to 20, 1916). Later in the year 
the German fleet was reinforced by the Baden 
(38 c.m.-guns) and the battle cruiser Hindenburg, 
but at the end of 1916 the function of the High 
Seas Fleet was to keep the gates for the U-boats 
in the great German submarine campaign. 

In this role of covering the operations of the 
submarines the German Battle Fleet had a very 
important influence upon the ensuing stages of 
the War. It was altogether a delusion to think 
that the career of the German fleet had been 
ended at Jutland — and that it "never came out." 
On the contrary. Admiral Scheer's fleet kept a 
wide area cleared for the egress and entrance of the 
German U-boats in their destructive campaign. 
If the German fleet had been destroyed in the 



46 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 



Jutland action, it would have been possible for 
the Allies to put in place and maintain mine 
barrages close to the German bases. There is no 
need to add anything to this statement to show 
the great results that would have been gained, if 
the British had been able to win a decision in the 
Battle of Jutland. 



The losses 


in the battle were as follows: 
BRITISH 


Tons 


Queen Maky 


{Battle Cruiser) 


26,350 


Ind efatigable 


(Battle Cruiser) 


18,800 


Invincible 


(Battle Cruiser) 


17,250 


Defence 


(Armored Cruiser) 


14,600 


Warriok 


(Armored Cruiser) 


13,550 


Black Prince 


(Armored Cruiser) 


13,350 


TiPPERARY 


(Destroyer) 


1,430 


Nestor 


(Destroyer) 


890 


Nomad 


(Destroyer) 


890 


Turbulent 


(Destroyer) 


1,100 


Fortune 


(Destroyer) 


965 


Ardent 


(Destroyer) 


935 


Shark 


(Destroyer) 


935 


Sparrowhawk 


(Destroyer) 
Total tonnage 


935 




111,980 




GERMAN 


Tons 


LtJTZOW 


(Battle Cruiser) 


26,180 


Pommern 


(Predreadnought) 


13,200 


Wiesbaden 


(Cruiser) 


5,400 


Elbing 


(Cruiser) 


4,500 


Rostock 


(Cruiser) 


4,900 


Frauenlob 


(Cruiser) 


2,700 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 47 

Tons 

V-4 {Destroyer) 570 

V-48 {Destroyer) 750 

V-27 {Destroyer) 640 

V-29 {Destroyer) 640 

S-33 {Destroyer) 700 



Total tonnage 60,180 

Killed and wounded : 

British (approximately) 6,600 

German 3,076 

In the early British accounts of the battle there 
were fanciful tales of pursuit of the German ships, 
through the night, and even after Admiral Jelli- 
coe's Report the British public did not at first 
realize the situation at the end of the action. But 
after a time, when this was better understood, 
there arose one of the greatest naval controversies 
that have ever agitated Great Britain, centered 
around the alleged "defensive" naval policy for 
maintaining the supremacy of Great Britain on 
the seas, — the pros and cons as to closing the 
Germans while there was light, and keeping in 
touch through the dark hours. 

This controversy as to the Battle of Jutland has 
been carried on with bitterness in Great Britain, 
and volumes of matter have been written that will 
be utterly useless, so far as a true story of the 
action is concerned. Partisans have made the mis- 
take of putting on record arguments that have 
been founded on phases of the British operations — 



48 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

with imaginary corresponding situations of the 
enemy, which never existed in actual fact. The 
preceding account may be rehed upon as tracing 
the main events of the battle — and the real course 
of the action shows that many briefs must be 
thrown out of court. 

Putting aside these contentions, and seeking only 
to visualize the truth, one is forced to the conclu- 
sion that the chief cause of failure on the part of 
the British fleet was the obvious handicap that 
methods had not been devised in advance for de- 
cisive operations under the existing conditions. 

The problem for the British was to unite two 
parts of a superior force, and to impose this united 
superior force with destructive effect upon the 
enemy. This problem was simplified by the fact 
that the weaker enemy voluntarily came into con- 
tact in a position where escape by flight was out 
of the question. On the other hand, the solution 
was made difficult by unusual conditions of mist 
and smoke. 

The decision was missed through the lack of 
rehearsed methods, not only for effectively joining 
the British forces, but for bringing into contact 
the superior British strength, against an enemy 
who actually possessed the great advantage of re- 
hearsed methods adapted to the existing conditions. 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 49 

These conditions must be realized in order to ar- 
rive at a fair verdict. 

When considering the Battle of Jutland, we 
must not think in the old terms of small dimen- 
sions, but we must picture the long miles of battle 
lines wreathed in mist and smoke, the great areas 
of manoeuvre — and the complicated diflficulties 
that must beset anyone who was called to com- 
mand in this first great battle of dreadnoughts. 
These widely extended manoeuvres of ships, only 
intermittently visible, must not be thought of as 
merely positions on a chart or game-board. 

Reviewing the course of the action, the conclu- 
sion cannot be avoided that, on the day of the 
battle and under its conditions, the Germans were 
better prepared in advance for a battle of fleets. 
In his book Lord Jellicoe states many advantages 
possessed by the German fleet in construction, 
armament, and equipment — but, as has been 
said, his revelation of the British lack of methods 
is more significant. 

All these deficiencies cannot be charged against 
Admiral Jellicoe, and the persistent efforts to give 
him all the blame are unjust. Is there any real 
evidence that another man would have done better 
under the circumstances? The tendency of cer- 
tain writers to laud Vice Admiral Beatty at the 



50 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

expense of Admiral Jellicoe does not seem justi- 
fied. As has been noted, when contact was estab- 
hshed with the German advance force, Beatty 
failed to bring his full strength into action against 
this isolated weaker enemy force. In the ensuing 
stages it cannot be denied that haphazard methods 
were in evidence. 

The idea must be put aside that the German 
ships were a huddled, helpless prey "delivered'* 
to the British Commander-in-Chief. On the con- 
trary, as stated, the German battle cruisers had 
already closed up with the German battleships 
and the High Seas Fleet had been slowed down to 
correct its formations. Consequently at this stage 
the German fleet was in hand and ready to sheer 
off, by use of their well rehearsed elusive manoeuvre 
of ships-right-about, with baffling concealment in 
smoke screens. It has been shown that after the 
Grand Fleet had completed deployment, the un- 
suspected situation existed in which Admiral 
Scheer's fleet was again in close contact with the 
British fleet. It has also been explained that Vice 
Admiral Beatty made his much discussed signal, 
to "cut off" the German fleet, long after Admiral 
Scheer had put his fleet into safety by his third 
swing-around of the German ships. With these 
situations totally uncomprehended, it cannot be 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 51 

said that Vice Admiral Beatty had a firmer grasp 
upon the actual conditions than anyone else. The 
simple truth is, the British Command was always 
compelled to grope for the German ships, while his 
enemies were executing carefully rehearsed elusive 
manoeuvres concealed in smoke — and the British 
were not prepared in advance to counter these 
tactics. 

In the matter of signaling, the Germans were 
far ahead — in that they had their manoeuvres 
carefully prepared in advance, to be executed with 
the minimum number of signals. The result was 
that, while the British Commander-in-Chief was 
obliged to keep up a constant succession of in- 
structions by signals, the German Admiral was 
able to perform his surprising manoeuvres with 
comparatively few master signals.^ Lord Jellicoe 
also emphasizes the great advantage possessed by 
the Germans in their recognition signals at night. 

Sir Percy Scott, as already quoted, bluntly 
states: "The British Fleet was not properly 
equipped for fighting an action at night. The 
German Fleet was." To this should be added the 
statement that the British fleet was not prepared 

^ "Jellicoe was sending out radio instructions at the rate of 
two a minute — while von Scheer made only nine such signals dur- 
ing the whole battle. This I learn on credible testimony." Rear 
Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, U.S.N. 



52 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

in methods in advance to cope with the conditions 
of the afternoon of May 31. The German fleet 
was. Herein lay the chief cause for failure to gain 
a decision, when the one great opportunity of the 
war was offered to the British fleet. 

In the three decades before The World War great 
strides had been made in naval development, with 
only the unequal fighting in the American War 
with Spain and in the East to give the tests of 
warfare. In this period it is probable that at 
different times first one navy would be in the lead 
and then another. It was the misfortune of the 
British in the Battle of Jutland that the Germans, 
at that time, were better prepared in equipment 
and rehearsed methods for an action under the 
existing conditions. This should be recognized as 
an important factor — and the failure to win a 
decision should not be wholly charged against the 
men who fought the battle. 

The destroyer came to its own in the Battle of 
Jutland as an auxiliary of the battle fleet, both for 
offense and defense. The whole course of the 
action proved that a screen of destroyers was abso- 
lutely necessary. For offense, it might be argued 
truthfully that, of the great number of torpedoes 
used, very few hit anything. The Marlborough 
was the only capital ship reported struck in the 



THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 53 

real action/ and she was able afterward to take 
some part in the battle, and then get back to her 
base. But above all things stands out the fact 
that it was the threat of night torpedo attacks by 
German destroyers, and the desire to safeguard 
the British capital ships from these torpedo at- 
tacks, which made the British fleet withdraw from 
the battlefield, and break off touch with the Ger- 
man fleet. Lord Jellicoe states that he "rejected 
at once the idea of a night action" on account of 
"first the presence of torpedo craft in such large 
numbers." (J) 

There is no question of the fact that this with- 
drawal of the British fleet had a great moral effect 
on Germany. Morale was all-important in The 
World War, and the announcement to the people 
and to the Reichstag had a heartening effect on 
the Germans at just the time they needed some 
such stimulant, with an unfavorable military situa- 
tion for the Central Powers. It also smoothed 
over the irritation of the German people against 
the German Navy, at this time when Germany 
had been obliged to modify her use of the U-boats 
upon the demand of the United States. For 
months after the battle the esteem of the German 

^ The Pommern was sunk in the night after the action of fleets 
had been broken off. 



54 THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

# 

people for the German Navy remained high, and 
this helped to strengthen the German Govern- 
ment. But the actual tactical result of the battle 
was indecisive. It may be said that the Germans 
had so manoeuvred their fleet that a detached 
part of the superior British force was cut up, but 
the damage was not enough to impair the estab- 
lished superiority of the British fleet. 

As a matter of fact the Battle of Jutland did not 
have any actual effect upon the situation on the 
seas. The British fleet still controlled the North 
Sea. The Entente Allies were still able to move 
their troops and supplies over water-ways which 
were barred to the Germans. Not a German ship 
was released from port, and there was no effect 
upon the blockade. After Jutland, as before, the 
German fleet could not impose its power upon 
the seas, and it could not make any effort to end 
the blockade. The Jutland action had cheered the 
German people but it had not given to Germany 
^ven a fragment of sea power. 



CHART NO. 2 
THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND 

(This chart is diagrammatic only) 



t, uied 1 



chnri 






all the 



"both 



Most of the published nam 

lion. It hoe been found posaih.^ . .-,---.- - - -r .u . . 

h., be«n .o placed that it can be opened outs.de the page, for u,e a. the tem . 
read. It .hould be noted that Bupcrimpo.ed indicationB hove been avoided, who, 
pflBaed over the same areas (especially in the three German ihips-nght-about n 
irei). Consequently this chart U diagrammatic only. 

I. BATTLE CRUISER ACTION 

® 3.80 P.M. Beatty siglits Hipper. 

© 3.-18 P.M. Battle cruisers engage at 18, .500 yds. 
forces opening fire practically simultaneously." 

® 4.06 P.M. Indffiiiigable sunk. 

® +.42 P.M. Beatty sights High Seas Fleet, and turns 
north (column right about). 

® 4.57 P.M. Evan-Thomas turns north, covering Beatty. 

® 5.35 P.M. Beatty's force, pursued by German battle 
cruisers and High Seas Fleet, on northerly course at long range. 

II. MAIN ENGAGEMENT 

® 5.56 P.M. Beatty sights Jellicoe and shifts to easterly 
course at utmost speed. 

® 6.20-7.00 P.M. Jellicoe deploys on port wing column 
(deployment "complete" at 6.38). Beatty takes position 
ahead of Grand Fleet. Hood takes station ahead of Beatty. 
Evan-Thomas falls in astern of Grand Fleet. 

Seheer turns whole German Fleet to west (ships right about) 
at 6.35, covered by smoke screens. Seheer repeats the turn of 
the whole fleet (ships right about) to east at 6.55. 

® 7.17 P.M. Seheer for the third time makes "swing- 
around" of whole German Fleet (ships right about) to south- 
west, under cover of smoke screens and destroyer attacks. Jel- 
licoe turns away to avoid tori)edoes (7.23). 

® 8.00 P.M. 

® 8.30-9.00 P.M. Jellicoe disposes for the night. 




..s^® BEATTY Ba ttle: of Jutla nd 
II Main ELngagemcnt. 

5.3 O - 9.00 



^LL^f^ WdSTCO 



McGrath-Sherrill Press 
graphic arts bldg. 

BOSTON 



